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EQUAL PROTECTION, CLASS LEGISLATION, 
AND SEX DISCRIMINATION: ONE SMALL 
CHEER FOR MR. HERBERT 
SPENCER'S SOCIAL STATICSt 
Mark G. Yudof* 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO 
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE. By William E. Nelson. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press. 1988. Pp. ix, 253. $25. 
Freedom being the prerequisite to normal life in the individual, equal 
freedom becomes the prerequisite to normal life in society. 
- Herbert Spencer, Social Statics 1 
Eclecticism in law and philosophy is rarely in fashion,2 for instinc-
tively many scholars strive for the systematic and universal, the 
woµld-be-conquerors of the diversity of history and ideologies and cul-
tural particularism. And the hedgehogs, to borrow from Isaiah Ber-
lin, 3 frequently command great respect from the foxes. It seems 
admirable that the hedgehogs seek to abstract the universal from the 
diverse and mundane, to perceive an interconnectedness amid the ap-
parent disarray and chaos. But the pursuit of Occam's razor also may 
distract a scholar and distort reality. As Grant Gilmore warned in 
The Ages of American Law, "the lesson of the past two hundred years 
is that we will do well to be on our guard against all-purpose theoreti-
cal solutions to our problems."4 
Profes~or William E. Nelson5 may be counted among the foxes. In 
his excellent book The Fourteenth Amendment, he declines to suc-
cumb to the temptation of conceptual unity for its own sake, for he 
prefers the messiness of historical accuracy. Professor Nelson's pri-
t © 1990 by Mark G. Yudof. 
* Dean and James A. Elkins Centennial Chair in Law, School of J.,aw, The University of 
Texas at Austin. B.A. 1965, LL.B. 1968, University of Pennsylvania. - Ed. I wish to express 
my appreciation to Douglas Laycock, Sanford Levinson, and Scot Powe for their many sugges· 
tions and criticisms. 
1. H. SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS 106 (1865). 
2. But see M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 
4-6 (1983); Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103 
(1983). 
3. I. BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox (1953). 
4. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 109 (1977). 
5. Professor of Law, New York University. A.B. 1962, Hamilton College; LL.B. 1965, New 
York University; Ph.D. 1971, Harvard University. 
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mary insight is that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment represents a complex, multifaceted concept, drawing on a 
number of distinct historical and intellectual traditions. The urge to 
identify a single animating philosophy or an overarching theory of 
equal protection is understandable but misguided.6 And for Nelson it 
is not just a question of multiple meanings of the text (p. 61) - the 
interpretative philosophy or hermeneutics, as the cognoscente would 
urge. 7 The framers of the Civil War amendments were eclectics in the 
best sense, drawing, perhaps naively and inconsistently, on natural 
rights,8 Jacksonian democratic principles,9 abolitionism,10 state consti-
tutional provisions, federalism, and other intellectual currents of the 
time. 11 As Professor Nelson notes, "Whatever the reality, a popular 
ideology of liberty and equality existed in antebellum America, This 
mid-nineteenth-century ideology, from which section one of the four-
teenth amendment was ultimately derived, had an amorphous quality 
that imprecisely linked together several ideas, each with a different 
core content" (p. 13; footnote omitted). 
The urge to stand on the shoulders of the framers or framing gen-
eration is virtually irresistible.12 But the unhappy truth - at least for 
those who seek definitive guidance from the past - is that the nine-
teenth-century mind was no more orderly, precise, consistent, or clear 
than the twentieth-century mind. 13 As Professor Nelson puts the 
point, with some irony, "it was the very emptiness and vagueness of 
the concept [of equality] that made it so useful and popular. Equality 
could mean almost anything ... " (p. 21). 
For better or worse, the equal protection clause represents a reser-
voir of concepts.14 This does not mean that the clause is infinitely 
elastic or that any level of judicial activism or restraint is excused. 15 
Nor does it sugge$t that the modem anachronists are necessarily vindi-
cated, as they perceive twentieth-century ideology in the prescient 
6. See generally Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 651 (1979). 
7. See generally INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (S. 
Levinson & S. Mailloux eds. 1988); Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1 
(1984). 
8. See, e.g., J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 21 (1965); Farber & Muench, The Ideologi-
cal Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, in 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 235 (1984); Soifer, supra 
note 6, at 659-65. 
9. See generally E. FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN (1970). 
10. Id. 
11. See generally H. HYMAN & w. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LA w (1982); Tussman 
& tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 31 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949). 
12. See R. NISBET, HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1980). 
13. See generally Farber & Muench, supra note 8, at 241-46. 
14. See H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTITUTION (1968). 
15. See Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court 1873-1903, 29 BUFFALO L. 
REV. 667 (1980). 
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minds of the nineteenth century. But it does suggest some care in dis-
entangling the various threads of the idea of equality embodied in the 
fourteenth amendment, some recognition that conflicts among com-
peting concepts may be inevitable, and some humility in asserting that 
one vision dictates its meaning. Justice Stevens' assertions notwith-
standing, 16 perhaps there is more than one equal protection clause. 
I 
Uncharitable though it may be to say so, the antislavery Republi-
cans who framed the equal protection clause "were not original think-
ers," and they thought of themselves as "guardians of the original 
American tradition, not as inventors of a novel ideology."17 One 
source of that tradition was the Enlightenment and the naturalistic 
theories that emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and 
informed the Declaration of Independence. 18 The concept of a higher 
law, Nelson suggests, embraced the claim "that God or nature re-
quired that people and their governments behave in particular ways" 
(p. 23). Another aspect of the American tradition asserted that citi-
zens had inherent rights that derived from the nature and form of a 
republican political and social system (p. 24). These arguments were 
often "a form of political rhetoric occasionally addressed to courts but 
more frequently addressed to legislative bodies or to the people them-
selves" (p. 23). 
The 1860 Republican platform specifically reaffirmed the natural 
law elements of the Declaration oflndependence.19 In this view, peo-
ple are equal in the sense of having an equal right to the state's protec-
tion of their natural freedoms. 20 Blacks possess such natural rights, 
and they are entitled to the full or equal protection of the law in assert-
ing them. 21 In that sense, the equal protection clause is a corrective 
measure that seeks not to create new rights but to guarantee the pro-
tection of already existent rights of African-Americans that were being 
disregarded by state governments.22 The most obvious manifestation 
16. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
17. Farber & Muench, supra note 8, at 241. 
18. Id. (citing J. LocKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 5 (J. Gough ed. 
1946)). 
19. Id. at 249. See generally E. FONER, supra note 9, at 75-76, 290. 
20. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 8, at 21. See generally N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL RIGHTS 
AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 60-83 (1982). 
21. See E. FONER, supra note 9, at 290-95; Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the 
Laws-A Historical Inquiry, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 499 (1985); Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment 
Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr. 305 (1988). 
22. See T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REsr 
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 466 (3d ed. 1874); 
see also Farber & Muench, supra note 8, at 269; Soifer, supra note 6, at 701. 
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of natural law theory is the 1866 Civil Rights Act,23 providing that 
blacks have the same rights as whites to enter into contracts, to own 
property, to sue, and to testify- in other words to invoke the protec-
tions of the legal system with regard to their civil or natural rights. 24 
This concept of the full protection of natural rights admits of a 
pluralistic vision of justice akin to Michael Walzer's theory of 
"spheres of justice."25 Equality in one sphere may co-exist with ine-
quality in another. For example, Lincoln believed in constitutional 
equality of civil and personal rights for African-Americans but he was 
opposed to the extension of suffrage to them. Economic equality 
would follow only if blacks took advantage of their legal rights to im-
prove their conditions {pp. 19-20). Other proponents of equality be-
lieved that inequality of wealth and social and political rights might 
co-exist with equality of civil or natural rights {p. 19). Their naive 
assumption was that the spheres can be separated, that inequalities in 
one domain will not spill over into another. 
The other natural law vision of equal protection drew on the social 
contract theories of seventeenth-century philosophers like Locke and 
Stair. Political authority can be justified and there is a duty to obey 
the law only if there is a contract among the members of a community 
- with no member having superiority over any other member. 26 Peo-
ple are equal in the sense of each person's voluntary consent counting 
equally, though they may not be equal in talents, virtue, status, or 
wealth. This theory is consistent with Kant's insistence on a morality 
premised on respect for persons and treating each individual as a king-
dom of ends, but it primarily reflects the idea that the legitimate exer-
cise of power is predicated on the consent of the governed. Equality of 
this sort defines the concept of citizenship.27 From this perspective, 
the fourteenth amendment can be viewed as repudiating the Dred Scott 
decision28 and its impoverished view of black citizenship.29 
Whatever the natural law background of the fourteenth amend-
ment, there is universal recognition that a fundamental purpose of the 
framers was to address racial discrimination in the post-Civil War 
period: 
The Republican proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment all agreed 
that race was not a legitimate reason to treat people differently in respect 
to their civil rights - that a black !Dan and a white man, even though 
23. Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)). 
24. See generally R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 169-70 (1977); Soifer, supra note 6, at 705. 
25. M. WALZER, supra note 2. 
26. See generally N. MAcCoRMICK, supra note 20. 
27. See Slaughter-House.Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 95-98 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting). 
28. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
29. See generally E. FoNER, supra note 9, at 261-300. 
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they occupied a different socio-economic position, must receive the same 
treatment from the law. [p. 89] 
The equal protection clause thus embraces a specific conception of ra-
cial justice - one that may permit protective measures in the transi-
tion from slavery to freedom30 even as it aspires to a more global 
concept of constitutional equality. And in the modern context, exten-
sions of equal protection doctrine to other groups increasingly have 
depended on extrapolating from the circumstances of African-
Americans. 31 
But nineteenth-century Americans, like their eighteenth-century 
counterparts, were not content to protect liberty only through the pro-
vision of rights. In Madisonian fashion, they believed that liberty re-
quires the proper governmental structure. However ironic it may 
appear more than one hundred years later, the framers of the four-
teenth amendment also were concerned with "federalism as a bulwark 
of liberty" (p. 27). Opponents of the amendment routinely invoked 
the specter of domination by the federal government and the diminu-
tion of state power (p. 111 ). Far from accepting such criticism, the 
proponents bridled and went to great lengths to rebut the argument. 
They argued that the Southern states would quickly comply with the 
amendment, thereby obviating the potential conflict with the national 
government (p. 111), that Congress would be the primary enforcer of 
the amendment and would respect states' rights (p. 112), and that 
"[t]he only effect of the amendment was to prevent the states from 
discriminating arbitrarily between different classes of citizens" (p. 
115). The last argument is the most interesting, for it undercuts natu-
ral law theories. It is predicated on the assumption that the fourteenth 
amendment did not create new rights, but only addressed the unequal 
treatment of classes of persons with respect to those rights that the 
states chose to recognize. 
To perceive the importance of any one of these three strands of 
equal protection - and I will soon add a fourth - is not to deny the 
importance or relevance of the other strands. That is the essence of 
Nelson's careful approach to constitutional history. But the modern 
interpreter of the equal protection clause should be wary, for the mul-
tiple historical roots of the fourteenth amendment breed complexity 
and confusion. This is particularly true, as Professor Nelson points 
out, because the framers did not view themselves as involved in the 
task of delineating a logical and coherent set of legal doctrines for ap-
plication in concrete cases: 
Those who used the discourse of equality, natural law, natural rights, 
and federalism in the three decades before the Civil War generally were 
30. See Soifer, supra note 6. 
31. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
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not concerned with intellectual coherence or precision, but with persuad-
ing those to whom their rhetoric was addressed .... 
Ultimately, the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment would re-
quire the transformation of this political rhetoric . . . into legal doc-
trine. . . . But the congressmen and state legislators who had been 
schooled in the imprecise modes of antebellum thought did not trans-
form their discourse overnight. They continued to make fuzzy use of the 
old antebellum ideas, in part, perhaps, because the old imprecision had 
the same value to them during Reconstruction that it had before the 
Civil War: it enabled them to retain the support of political coalitions 
whose individual members shared an agreement only about vague ideas, 
not about specific programs. [pp. 36, 38-39; citation omitted] 
In this light, it is a mistake to assess the fourteenth ·amendment as if it 
were a conventional example of lawmaking. Rather, as Professor Nei-
son suggests, it is far more accurate to understand the fourteenth 
amendment as a "peace treaty to be administered by Congress," a 
treaty that embodied conflicting and ambiguous antebellum "hopes for 
a just society" (pp. 110-11). 
II 
While there are many :flowers (and perhaps a few weeds) in the 
equal protection garden, some :flowers have received more appreciative 
gazes than others. In large measure, I attribute the neglect to a simple 
misperception: too many modern constitutionalists ignore the history 
of the Jacksonian concept of equal protection before it was trans-
formed by the abolitionists and embodied in the fourteenth amend-
ment. To correct this misperception, I wish to explore at length 
another facet of equal protection, a facet that thus far I have deliber-
ately overlooked in Professor Nelson's splendid taxonomy. I then will 
apply the antebellum concept of equal protection, as refined in the 
fourteenth amendment, to the question of sex discrimination. 
The fertile ground for our inquiry is deceptively simple and derived 
from Jacksonian and antislavery principles (pp. 13-21): the fourteenth 
amendment should guarantee equality under the law.32 As Represen-
tative John Bingham eloquently stated the idea, the equal protection 
clause declares "the absolute equality of all citizens of the United 
States politically and civilly before their own laws;' (p. 78): 
Your Constitution provides that no man, no matter what his color, no 
matter beneath what sky he may have been born, no matter in what 
disastrous conflict or by what tyrannical hand his liberty may have been 
cloven down, no matter how poor, no matter how friendless, no matter 
how ignorant, shall be deprived of life or liberty or property without due 
process oflaw - law in its highest sense, that law which is the perfection 
32. See N. MAcCoRMICK, supra note 20. See generally F. HAYEK, THE CONSI1TUTION OF 
LIBERTY (1960); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). 
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of human reason, and which is impartial, equal, exact justice. [p. 78; 
footnote omitted] 
To state the principle more generally, the nineteenth-century notion of 
equality before the law was one of a normative order "which impar-
tially and universally regulates the actions and relationships of legal 
persons" through general and abstract laws. 33 
Before proceeding to a more detailed analysis of equality under 
law, two preliminary observations are in order. First, the federal equal 
protection clause drew on earlier state constitutional provisions seek-
ing similar objectives. The eminent nineteenth-century treatise writer 
Thomas Cooley said as much, urging that "it was not within the 
power of the States before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, 
to deprive citizens of the equal protection of the laws .... "34 It was 
only the unwillingness of many states to afford equal protection to 
freed blacks that occasioned the immediate need for the amendment 
(p. 79). 
Second, the confusion surrounding the equal protection clause 
stems in part from a misunderstanding of the normative roots of 
equality under law.35 Such equality is not only a principle of formal 
justice; it also draws on a distinctly nineteenth-century concept of lib-
erty. 36 Equal protection affirms the autonomy and liberty of persons 
to order their own affairs, subject to general laws which do not create 
favored or disfavored classes of citizens. 37 Equality refers to equality 
of freedom and not to equality in the sense of achieving distributive 
justice. 
To comprehend this meaning of equal protection, one should begin 
with the language of the Constitution itself. The fourteenth amend-
ment declares that a state may not "deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law" or "deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."38 Equal pro-
tection of the laws is afforded to "any person," not just to blacks. 39 
While the equal protection clause was certainly designed to eliminate 
some or all forms of racial discrimination, 40 it creates protections for 
33. N. MAcCoRMICK, supra note 20, at 7. 
34. See T. CoOLEY, supra note 22, at 466. 
35. See generally H. MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND· 
MENT (1977); Farber & Muench, supra note 8; Kay, supra note 15. 
36. See F. HAYEK supra note 32; H. SPENCER, supra note 1. 
37. See F. HAYEK supra note 32, at 154. 
38. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
39. See generally H. GRAHAM, supra note 14; Laycock, Book Review, 59 TEXAS L. REV. 
343 (1981) (reviewing J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980)). 
40. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 8; Dimond, Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Ra-
cial Discrimination Under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretivist 
Grounds, SO MICH. L. REv. 462 (1982); Soifer, supra note 6. See generally H. BELZ, A NEW 
BIRTH OF FREEDOM (1976); Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection 
of the Laws'~ 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 421. 
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all.41 Indeed, even pre-Civil War abolitionists understood the need for 
a more expansive approach to equality under law: 
What ... began as a campaign for protection of slaves and free Negroes 
presently became one to guarantee civil liberties more generally. Obliged 
to defend even their rights to discuss slavery and to seek its overthrow by 
constitutional means, abolitionists focused intently on the problem of se-
curing and enforcing constitutional rights. They were interested, not 
merely in their own rights, but also in those of other dissident and un-
popular groups including Indians and Mormons.42 
But if equal protection means something more than a substantive pro-
hibition on racial discrimination, what exactly does it mean? 
Consider the claim of Thomas Cooley, perhaps the most influential 
constitutional writer of the nineteenth century, that the principle of 
equal protection was embodied in the Constitution even before the 
fourteenth amendment was adopted: 
It was not within the power of the States before the adoption of the 
fourteenth amendment, to deprive citizens of the equal protection of the 
laws; but there were servile classes not thus shielded, and when these 
were made freemen, there were some who disputed their claim to citizen-
ship, and some State laws were in force which established discrimina-
tions against them. To settle doubts and preclude such laws, the 
fourteenth amendment was adopted; and the same securities which one 
citizen may demand, all others are entitled to. 43 
Cooley's analysis, put forward only a few years after the ratification of 
the fourteenth amendi;nent, asserts that the amendment only clarified 
the application of an older principle of law to the newly emancipated 
slaves. Howard Graham, in his massive analysis of the history of the 
fourteenth amendment, agreed with Cooley's assessment nearly a hun-
dred years later: 
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment, like the Bill of Rights which the Fathers 
added to the original Constitution-in 1791, was regarded by its framers 
and ratifiers as declaratory of the previously existing law and 
Constitution . 
. . . [S]ection 1 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] blanketed the freed-
men in; it couldn't and didn't throw others out. Application of these 
guarantees in defense of Negro and racial rights, in other words, was 
climatic, normative, additive, not original, unique, or exclusionary. Ne-
groes were to get what others long ago had had. That was the whole 
41. See H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 169; H. TAYLOR, DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THE 
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 48 (1917); Laycock, supra note 39. 
42. H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 169 (footnote omitted). 
43. T. CoOLEY, supra note 22, at 466; see also H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 299-300, 322-
23. John A. Bingham, the Ohio Congressman who later was the primary draftsman of§§ 1 and 
5 of the fourteenth amendment, made much the same point in 1859. H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, 
at 283-84. See generally P. PALUDAN, A CoVENANT WITH DEATH: THE CoNSTITUTION, 
LAW, AND EQUALITY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1975). 
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thought and point .... 44 
Thus, as Professor Nelson well understands, equal protection 
speaks not only to race but also to an underlying constitutional princi-
ple of nondiscrimination by class that includes the prohibition of racial 
discrimination (p. 133). It is broader than the narrow principle that 
the fourteenth amendment prohibits state-sponsored racism, deriving 
protection for other groups only by analogy (p. 180). These nonracial 
origins of the unequal treatment of classes under the equal protection 
clause, too often, have been ignored by twentieth-century courts and 
scholars, particularly as they rush to limit judicial review in cases aris-
ing in the economic sphere. 45 
III 
The bedrock principle underlying the quest for equality under law 
is disarmingly simple: "every one has a right to demand that he be 
governed by general rules."46 No class of persons is to be privileged. 
There are to be no castes of untouchables. That principle can be 
traced to varied sources, including the British political philosophers 
upon whose ideas the American Declaration of Independence is 
largely foun,ded. Nineteenth-century court opinions make frequent 
reference to John Locke's maxim that' those who legislate "are to gov-
ern by promulgated, established laws, not to be varied in particular 
cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court 
and the countryman at plough";47 Blackstone, Rousseau, even Cicero 
are relied upon for similar sentiments.48 The idea,of "equality before 
the law," advanced by Charles Sumner in 1849, looked back to the 
French revolutionary constitution of 1791: "Men are born and con-
tinue free and equal in their rights."49 And English common law and 
statutes were hostile to domestic monopolies, monopolies that re-
stricted the liberties of some merchants but not others. so 
But the sources of this idea of equality are also found on this side 
of the Atlantic. The Declaration of Independence comes immediately 
to mind. So also do the provisions of the Constitution that bar grant-
ing title~ of nobility, impairing contractual obligations, or enacting 
44. H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 299-300, 581 (emphasis added; footnote omitted); see also 
Farber & Muench, supra note 8. 
45. P. 20Q. See generally Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation, 3 LAW & 
HISr. R.Ev. 293 (1985). 
46. T. COOLEY, supra note 22, at 459. 
47. Id. (quoting J. LoCKE, LoCKE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 142 p. 459); see e.g., State v. 
Duffy, 7 N~v. 342, 349 (1872). 
48. See Frank & Munro, supra note 40, at 436. 
49. Id. (quoting c. SUMNER, 10 WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER 282, 327 (1874)). 
50. See, e.g., Darcey v. Allin, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B. 1602); Davenant v. Hurdis, 72 Eng. 
Rep. 769 (K.B. 1599). See generally Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Four-
teenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785, 792-97 (1982). 
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laws that apply after the fact or single out particular individuals for 
government attention - aii of which go to confirm the belief that "all 
are equals in government."51 For that reason, law must be general, 
and not particularized; future-looking, not retrospective. Five of the 
original thirteen states recommended that the proposed Bill of Rights 
forbid Congress from granting "exclusive advantages of commerce" to 
particular merchants or companies. 52 Many nineteenth-century state 
constitutions insisted that legislatures proceed by general rather than 
special laws. 53 Even in states whose constitutions did not specifically 
ban special legislatio~, courts relied on provisions such as "law-of-the-
land" clauses to require general laws, "equally binding upon every 
member of the community."54 
This concern with general laws, according to Professor F.A. 
Hayek, was the chief constitutional development of pre-Civil War 
America: 
We find in discussions of the period constant references to the concep-
tion of "general laws, formed upon deliberation, under the influence of 
no resentment, and without knowing upon whom they will operate." 
There was much discussion of the undesirability of "special" as distin-
guished from "general" acts. Judicial decisions repeatedly stressed that 
laws proper ought to be "general public laws equally binding upon every 
member of the community under similar circumstances." Various at-
tempts were made to embody this distinction in state constitutions, until 
it came to be regarded as one of the chief limitations upon legislation. 55 
51. See J. ELY, supra note 31, at 90-91; F. HAYEK, supra note 32, at 188; Corwin, The Basic 
Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. REV. 247, 248-55 (1914). 
52. Conant, supra note 50, at 800-01. 
53. See T. CooLEY, supra note 22, at 456-66. 
54. Durkee v. Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 470 (1871); cf. Bailey v. Illinois, 190 Ill. is, 60 N.E. 98 
(1901). 
55. F. HAYEK, supra note 32, at 188 (footnote omitted). State supreme courts were generally 
not reluctant, except in volatile cases involving the treatment of blacks or other racial minorities, 
to overturn special legislation as in violation of state constitutions. For example, as early as 
1814, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in refusing to uphold the suspension of a 
general law in favor of an individual, stated: 
It is manifestly contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the 
spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges and advan-
tages which are denied to all others under like circumstances; or that any one should be 
subjected to losses, damages, suits or actions, from which all others under like circumstances 
are exempted. 
Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396, 404 (1814) (citations omitted). Similarly, Chancellor Kent, writ-
ing in 1816, opined that a law limited to public officials was unconstitutional since it was "not 
impartial in the imposition which it creates. If the principle be just, it ought to have a general 
and equal application." w. KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETfERS OF JAMES KENT, LL.D. 163 (1898). 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in 1860 stated that the legislature "cannot, under color of 
making laws to regulate and extend the boundaries of cities or villages, enact for the mere pur-
pose of cutting off or reducing the exemptions of particular individuals, and thus legislate spe-
cially for it against certain persons, contrary to the spirit and intent of the constitution." Bull v. 
Conroe, 13 Wis. 260, 272-73 (1860). Judge Cooley cites numerous state court decisions to the 
same effect and synthesizes them into the following general rule: 
[A] statute would not be constitutional which should proscribe a class or a party for opin-
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More recently, Professor Robert Gordon, writing from a political per-
spective very different from that of Hayek, concurred in his appraisal 
of nineteenth-century constitutional law: "[F]reedom and jural equal-
ity, regardless of status, are made to depend on the abstract, formally 
realizable, nondiscretionary, and above all general nature of legal 
principles. "56 
The idea that laws should be general and not tainted by considera-
tions of class or caste was widely recognized and accepted before the 
fourteenth amendment was enacted (pp. 13-21). It was part-and-par-
cel of the presumed fairness of governmental processes, 57 of due pro-
cess of law. When Cooley argued that the states were not free to deny 
the equal protection of the laws even before the adoption of the Civil 
War amendments, he was generally drawing on due process notions. 
He presumably meant that state due process, equal protection, special 
legislation, and other constitutional clauses had implicitly or explicitly 
forbidden "special" or "class" legislation, and his treatise devoted 
most of its section on impartial legislation to developments in the 
states prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. 58 He made 
only fleeting references to the newly enacted equal protection clause. 
President Jackson, in his veto message on the second national 
bank, also had stressed that the law should not add "artificial distinc-
tions" by seeking "to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, 
to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful."59 He first 
advanced the phrase "equal protection" in 1832, almost forty years 
before it was written into the Constitution: 
ion's sake, or which should select particular individuals from a class or locality, and subject 
them to peculiar rules, or impose upon them special obligations or burdens, from which 
others in the same locality or class are exempt. 
T. CooLEY, supra note 22, at 457-58. 
56. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 1870-1920, 
in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA, 1730-1940, at 90 (G. Geison ed. 
1983). 
57. The notion of fair procedures included the requirement that the law be the same for all, 
that it subject different persons to the same rules for vindicating entitlements and resolving dis-
putes. See Durkee v. Janesville, 28 Wis. 464 (1871). As Cooley quotes an 1825 Maine Supreme 
Court decision: 
On principle it can never be within the bounds of legitimate legislation to enact a special 
law, or pass a resolve dispensing with the general law in a particular case, and granting a 
privilege and indulgence to one man, by way of exemption from the operation and effect of 
such general law, leaving all other persons under its operation. Such a law is neither just nor 
reasonable in its consequences. It is our boast that we live under a government of laws, and 
not of men; but this can hardly be deemed a blessing, unless those laws have for their im-
movable basis the great principles of constitutional equality. 
T. CooLEY, supra note 22, at 459 n.2 (quoting Lewis v. Webb., 3 Me. 326, 336 (1825)). Or, as 
Daniel Webster urged in his famous argument in the Dartmouth College Case, a legislative enact-
ment must be a general law ifit is "to be considered the law of the land." Trustees of Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
58. T. COOLEY, supra note 22, at 456-66. 
59. J. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 145 (1978) (quoting 
Jackson). 
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There are no necessary evils in Government. Its evils exist only in its 
abuses. If it would confine itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does 
it showers its favor alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor, 
it would be an unqualified blessing. 60 
This substantive view of equal protection was rooted, in part, in a 
due process conception of the separation of legislative and judicial 
powers. Due process required that legislative bodies enact general 
laws, that they legislate for all citizens. 61 Legislatures were not to en-
act laws that benefited or harmed particular classes and individuals in 
a predictable manner.62 Conversely, "judicial and quasi-judicial of-
ficers regularly and legitimately make decisions about individuals."63 
Due process, then, meant different things for different branches of gov-
ernment. Legislatures are not required to give notice of pending legis-
lation to affected parties, nor must they listen to such parties. But 
legislatures must enact general laws, laws that do not create classes of 
disfavored citizens (p. 180). Judicial bodies were to provide each per-
son with the process that was due in applying abstract laws to specific 
persons. Here due process did require notice and a meaningful oppor-
tunity for the individual to be heard. 64 In this sense, the equal protec-
tion clause did little more than affirm a structural vision of due 
process, 65 an affirmation necessitated by the mistreatment of African-
Americans by state governments. 
The difficulty of elaborating this principle of equal protection re-
sides in defining what one means by a general law and then applying 
that definition to concrete cases. The framers of the fourteenth 
amendment faced two critical issues that continue to plague fourteenth 
amendment analysis to this day: 
The first one, once they moved beyond obviously defective racial criteria, 
was to distinguish classifications that would be reasonable under the 
amendment from those that would be arbitrary. The second one was 
whether legislation which classified people on both reasonable and arbi-
trary grounds should be declared unconstitutional. [p. 138] 
But, while they discussed equality under the law at length, the framers 
60. Id. (emphasis added). 
61. See Laycock, supra note 39, at 372. 
62. F. HAYEK, supra note 32, at 210. Justice Stevens has made a similar point: 
All general laws - whether designed to protect the health of the community, to control 
urban traffic, to improve the environment, or to raise tax revenues - curtail the individual's 
freedom to do as he pleases .•.. Ordinarily the mere fact that the existence of a general 
regnlation may significantly impair individual liberty raises no question under the Due Pro-
cess Clause. But the Clause is implicated when the State singles out one person for adverse 
treatment significantly different from that imposed on the community at large. 
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 484-85 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). See 
generally Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 496-98 (1979). 
63. Laycock, supra note 39, at 372. 
~·Id. 
65. Cf. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561 (1983). 
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rarely attempted to connect general principles to concrete applications 
(p. 144). 
When the framers did attempt to explain the meaning of equality 
under the equal protection clause, their explanations often were not 
particularly enlightening. For example, Professor Nelson quotes from 
a congressional speech by Senator Richard Yates in which Yates at-
tempted to illuminate the distinction: 
To define the length of residence necessary to enable a man to vote, to 
say what his age shall be, is one thing; and to say that he shall not vote at 
all because he is black or white, is an entirely different thing. In the 
latter case, color is made the disqualification, just as race would be if 
Germans were excluded from the ballot-box. The State may preserve a 
right; it may fix the qualifications; it may impose certain restrictions so 
as to have that right preserved in the best form to the people; but it is not 
legitimately in the power of the State, it is not in the power of the Con-
gress of the United States, it is not in any earthly power to destroy a 
man's equal rights to his property, to his franchise, to his suffrage, or to 
the right to aspire to office - I mean according to the true theory of a 
republican government. [p. 83; citation omitted] 
But while Senator Yates gives an example of class legislation, beyond 
all "earthly power," and of a reasonable classification (though the 
modern Supreme Court disagrees),66 he gives not a hint as to what is 
the conceptual basis of the distinction. Ultracrepidarian rhetoric sim-
ply substitutes itself for theoretical clarity. 
The framers' inability to articulate a theory of class legislation may 
be explained by the inherent difficulty of the problem; philosophers 
have debated the meaning of equality for many centuries. But Profes-
sor Nelson argues that the absence of a coherent theory of equality is 
not just an accident or a function of the intractability of the intellec-
tual puzzle; rather, it is also a testament to the political realities of the 
time: 
[M]ost of the rhetoric of equality preached by the Republican supporters 
of the Fourteenth Amendment never went beyond vague generalities .•.. 
Republicans agreed that all people, including blacks, were entitled to 
equal rights. However, an element of the agreement - an element es-
sential to creating the supermajorities need to incorporate the equal pro-
tection concept into the Fourteen Amendment - was its ultimate 
emptiness. Americans of 1866, like Americans of today, could agree 
upon the rightfulness of equality only because they did not agree on its 
meaning, and their political leaders, unlike the managers of the modem 
bureaucratic state, were content to enact the general principle rather 
than its specific applications into law. [p. 80; footnote omitted] 
Thus the critical questions of equal protection analysis - which classi-
66. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (one-year residency requirement for 
voting declared unconstitutional). 
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fl.cations of persons run afoul of equal protection and why do they do 
so - were rarely answered by the framers. 
To discern the meaning of equality under the fourteenth amend-
ment, one must begin with a recognition that slavery and race were the 
driving forces of conceptual disharmony during the first half of the 
nineteenth century.67 President Jackson's vision of equal protection 
extended only to social and economic barriers and was influenced by 
the traditional abhorrence of state-created monopolies;68 its applica-
tion to blacks "would have astounded Jackson, who would assuredly 
have disapproved."69 But sometimes powerful ideas drift across ideo-
logical barriers; 70 they become serviceable in the aid of new causes, 
though the transition may cause confusion. Such a drift occurred in 
nineteenth-century America. Professor Eric Foner ably describes this 
phenomenon as many Jacksonian Democrats moved from a focus on 
"banks, monopolies, and paper money" ("Money Power") to a focus 
on slavery and the South ("Slave Power").71 Consider Foner's por-
trayal of Senator Thomas Morris, a leading anti-slavery Jacksonian 
Democrat: 
In 1838 and 1839, Morris ... astounded the Senate and electrified ~ti­
slavery northerners by declaring that a new power, based on slavery, was 
threatening the liberties of the nation .... He [later] pledged to devote 
his energies to the cause of emancipation, "and against the power of 
these two great interests - the slave power of the South, and banking 
power of the North - which are now uniting to rule this country." ... 
[H]e warned that, ju~t as with the Bank, the people would mobilize 
against the Slave Power - "this goliath of all monopolies." 
... [It] the Money Power was the "master symbol" for the Age of 
Jackson, the Slave Power was equally effective as a symbol for all the 
fears and hostilities harbored by northerners toward slavery and the 
South. Morris and countless Jacksonians who later joined the Republi-
can party showed how easily one could jump from one master symbol to 
the next. The fight against the Bank ... represented for the Jacksonians 
"equality against privilege, liberty against domination, honest work 
against dead precedent."72 
The transformation from Jacksonian equal protection to antislav-
ery equal protection produced enormous strain in the political and 
legal systems. Many state constitutions and statutes continued to dis-
criminate against free blacks in the 1800-1860 petiod, 73 and courts 
67. See generally M. TuSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY 1810-1860 (1981). 
68. See generally Conant, supra note 50. 
69. J. POLE, supra note 59, at 146. 
70. See Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amend-
ment, 1990 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming). 
71. E. FONER, supra note 9, at 90. 
72. Id. at 90-91 (citations omitted). 
73. See H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 162. 
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often responded with disingenuousness or silence. For example, Chief 
Justice Lemuel Shaw of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Alger14 
fully endorsed the distinction between "class legislation and legislation 
enacted for the purpose of benefiting the polity as a whole" (p. 176). 
As Professor Nelson writes: 
At issue in Alger was whether the state could limit the length to which 
docks extended into Boston harbor in order to insure the free passage of 
vessels in shipping channels. The court held that "all real estate . . . is 
subject to some restraint for the general good" and that the legislature 
had "power, by general law affecting all . . . equally and alike, to make 
reasonable regulations, declaring the public right." ... Laws that bene-
fited and affected all equally were to be distinguished, in tum, from class 
legislation - laws that, in common nineteenth century jargon, took 
property or rights away from A merely for the purpose of giving the 
same property or rights to B. Such class legislation was, of course, arbi-
trary and unreasonable. [pp. 17 6-77; footnotes omitted] 
Yet, writing two years earlier, Shaw had concluded that separate 
schools for black and white students did not violate that principle. 75 
The important point about this period, despite many setbacks in 
the courts, is that the abolitionists and radical Republicans of that era 
were drawing on an existing concept of equal protection when they 
argued for eradicating slavery and protecting the rights of African-
Americans. 76 When the phrase "equal protection" worked its way 
into the platforms and candidates' speeches of the Liberty, Free Soil, 
and Republican parties in the 1840-1860 period,77 they were not in-
venting a concept to deal with the exigency of slavery; rather, they 
were reexamining an older concept, reshaping it in the service of their 
cause.'\ 
As the concept of equal protection or equality under the law 
evolved, analytic problems also surfaced in nonracial cases. As the 
nineteenth century progressed, legislative supremacy in the states de-
clined. Scandals tarnished many legislatures, and, in the Jacksonian 
era, voters began to fear landlords, creditors, and the wealthy - those 
who were thought to be too powerful in legislative processes. Restric-
tions on legislative power became more frequent, and often took the 
form of bans on local or special legislation. 78 The most frequent in-
74. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851). 
75. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1849); see also Van Camp v. 
Board of Educ. of Logan, 9 Ohio St. 326 (1859). See generally H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 
172-85; L. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957); J. 
PoLE, supra note 59, at 146-47; Baltimore & Williams, The State Constitutional Roots of the 
''Separate But Equal" Doctrine: Roberts v. City of Boston, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 537 (1986). 
76. See generally H. GRAHAM, supra note 14; Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the 
Antebellum Era, 32 AMER. J. LEGAL H1sr. 305 (1988). 
77. See H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 301. 
78. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW, 107-08, 305 (1973); Benedict, supra 
note 45. 
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stances of unconstitutional special laws were those suspending a stat-
ute of limitations, granting rights of appeal, and authorizing divorces 
in particular instances when such rights were not generally available.79 
Yet how were these laws different from special provisions for common 
carriers and bankers, and statutes granting corporate franchises to 
named persons, all of which were widely upheld?80 
The conceptual disunity of equal protection in the antebellum pe-
riod demonstrates a profound point about the idea of equality. Equal-
ity has no meaning without some prior conception of substantive 
rights, for we must determine how people are alike before we can ap-
ply equal protection standards. 81 Yet the determination of likeness 
veils a substantive determination of rights, since equality will flow in-
extricably from such prior and "anterior constitutional standards."82 
If persons are to be treated with equal respect, then one must ascertain 
first those traits that entitle one to equal respect - and those traits 
will stem from a substantive concept of rights. 83 
There is no easy way out of this quandary. The equal protection 
clause in conjunction with the privileges and immunities clause of the 
fourteenth amendment is a substantive provision designed to secure 
liberty for all, not just racial minorities or other special groups. 84 This 
objective was to be achieved through the concept of equality under 
law, connecting the antebellum insistence on general and abstract laws 
with the post-Civil War federal guarantee of equal protection. But the 
historical antipathy to class legislation and the distaste for special laws 
did not reflect a more general hostility toward classifications in law, 
for distinctions among groups for purposes of taxation, expending 
79. T. CoOLEY, supra note 22, at 4S8-S9. Some lawyers even argued that all ·~udge-made 
law is special legislation" because of its ad hoc nature, and that "[a]ll American law must be a 
statute law." R. Rantoul, Oration at the Scituate (July 4, 1836), reprinted in THE LEGAL MIND 
IN AMERICA 222-27 (P. Miller ed. 1962). 
80. T. COOLEY, supra note 22, at 4S7, 460-62; see also State v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342, 3S3 (1872) 
(concurring opinion); H. TAYLOR, supra note 41, at 829. The rationality standard for reviewing 
such classifications is not very helpful. See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, SS NEB. L. REv. 
197 (1976). Hayek is exactly right when he says that to argue "that the law must not make 
irrelevant distinctions or that it must discriminate between persons for reasons which have no 
connection with the purpose of the law is little more than evading the issue." F. HAYEK, supra 
note 32, at 209 (footnote omitted); see also Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: 
Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1049 (1979); Sunstein, Public Values, 
Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 SUP. Cr. REv. 127. 
81. See, e.g., Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and 
the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 6S3, 6S4-63 (197S); Sunstein, supra note 80, at 129-30; 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 9S HARV. L. REv. S37 (1982). 
82. Westen, supra note 81, at S60; see also J. LUCAS, THE PRINCIPLES OF PoLmcs 2SO-Sl 
(1966). 
83. Westen, supra note 81, at S49. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
273 (1977). 
84. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 8, at 237; see also Conant, supra note SO, at 818-23, 829-30; 
Maltz, supra note 76, at 323. 
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public funds, and police regulation were routine (p. 138). As Profes-
sor Nelson articulates the dilemma: 
The very essence of all law is to discriminate - to separate out the occa-
sions on which one legal consequence rather than an opposite one will 
obtain. A theory that the state should treat all people equally cannot 
mean that the state may never treat two people differently, for such a 
theory would mean the end of all law. In order to sustain a principle of 
equality under law - the principle for which the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment were striving, it is necessary to have some theory 
about when discrimination is appropriate and when it is not. [p. 138] 
But what is the theory? The antebellum history of equal protec-
tions provides some elements of a general theory, some weak and 
strong forces that need to be taken into account, but no unified theory 
of equality. Classifications that express a raw preference for some in-
dividuals or classes over others, involving little concern for the general 
public good, are disfavored. The law should not favor the rich over 
the poor. Further, closed classifications and those involving immuta-
ble characteristics are greater restrictions on liberty than open classifi-
cations. If a special law allows only John Jones a discharge in 
bankruptcy or a divorce in particular circumstances, the law not only 
creates a class consisting of one person but also a closed class, to 
which no other person can fit himself or herself. As a prima facie 
matter, the law appears to be more concerned with favoring one citi-
zen over others than it is with advancing the general good. The same 
problem occurs if a law is enacted to favor or disfavor people with red 
hair (p. 180). By contrast, if a tax is levied on real but not personal 
property, an individual may choose, perhaps with great difficulty, 
which form of property to hold. Open classifications of this type allow 
individuals to exercise their liberty more fully, giving them more con-
trol of the legal consequences of their decisions. 
In addition, the role of tradition and cultural norms is difficult to 
deny. In examining the decisions of the Supreme Court in the late 
nineteenth century, Professor Nelson notes that the Court's decisions 
on the legitimacy of particular classifications often reflected prevailing 
attitudes among Americans: 
The Court was able . . . to avoid divisive declarations of principle and 
focus instead on questions of a more empirical nature about whether 
groups classified differently by legislation were, in fact, similar and hence 
entitled to equal treatment. At times, the Court was also able to take 
advantage of widespread agreement on specific factual assumptions 
about whether differences between people would justify legislation treat-
ing them differently. Thus in Bradwell it could rest on the widely shared 
perception that women should have a different social role than men, 
while in Bartemeyer it could rely on the shared understanding that pro-
hibition laws were not enacted so that the class of nondrinkers would 
improve their welfare at the expense of drinkers, but in order to enhance 
the well-being of all. [p. 178] 
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The incoherence of theory, of course, arises precisely because the 
intellectual underpinnings of equal protection could so easily come 
into conflict or be construed in different, ways. To make the most obvi-
ous points, classifications involving racial and ethnic minorities and 
women may be traditional or largely affirmed in popular culture, and 
yet such classifications may be closed and evidence a crude preference 
for some classes of people over others. Most user fees imposed by 
government favor the affluent over the poor, and yet such fees are 
wiqely upheld. Some closed classifications, for example the selection 
of persons of a particular minimum age for military service, do not 
appear to reflect a class bias and may be defended on general welfare 
grounds. 
From this perspective, and whatever the ambiguities, the constitu-
tional affirmation of equality under the law and the resistance to retro-
active laws and bills of attainder speak more generally to a larger 
principle of enhancing liberty. Every law or tax bespeaks a denial of 
liberty, as Jeremy Bentham once noted, but laws designed only to dis-
favor particular groups or to create closed classes are perhaps the most 
egregious denials of liberty, for they deny mature persons responsibil-
ity for their actions. 85 The principle might be described as one of 
equal liberty or freedom. In this sense, state court decisions striking 
down special legislation and the evolution of fourteenth amendment 
protections for African-Americans and other groups both speak to the 
same underlying evils. 
This approach to equal protection does not dispose of many of the 
most vexing dilemmas created by the concept. Whether a classifica-
tion is based on legitimate dissimilarities - for example, whether and 
when children are incapable of making decisions for themselves - will 
spark disagreement, and cultural norms may well prevail. Children 
often are not governed by general laws, and their liberties often do not 
stand on the same footing as those of adults. Nor will there be consen-
sus concerning which exigencies justify liberty-diminishing distinc-
tions. The abstract principles embraced by the framers of the 
fourteenth amendment do not easily settle concrete disputes. 
But one should not underestimate the impact of the historical roots 
of equality under law on modem equal protection theory. 86 For exam-
ple, the majority opinion in Morey v. Doud 87 - a case that, unfortu-
SS. See Sunstein, supra note 80, at 131: "In brief, the Court requires differential treatment to -
be justified by reference to some public value. A justification that rests on the intrinsic value of 
treating one person differently from another is prohibited." See also B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL 
JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); Bennett, supra note 80. 
86. See, e.g., Bennett supra note 80; Sunstein, supra note 80. 
87. 354 U.S. 457 (1957). Compare Morey (Illinois statute prohibiting currency exchanges 
from doing business on the premises of another business, but specifically exempting the Ameri-
can Express Co. from the prohibition, denies ccimpetitors equal protection under the 14th 
Amendment.) with Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 184 (1935) (Although 
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nately, the Supreme Court later overruled as it rushed to abandon 
judicial review in the economic sphere88 - relies on the closed nature 
of a classification to invalidate a law under the equal protection clause; 
this analysis of closed classifications finds parallels in discussions of 
immutable biological differences, when the Justices determine whether 
a group constitutes a "suspect" class. 89 But one also should not un-
derestimate the differences between a liberty-based or equality-under-
law theory of equal protection and other glosses that have been placed 
on that provision. 
Professor John Hart Ely, in an analysis that extrapolates from the 
historical plight of African-Americans to political structure, urges that 
the equal protection clause should be seen as protecting the openness 
of political processes.90 Equal protection is to be afforded to "discrete 
and insular" minorities, to use the famous phrase,91 and it should seek 
to open the pluralistic processes of governance in a democracy to those 
who have been politically isolated. Clearly, this approach draws on 
the racial origins of the equal protection clause, and it has much to 
commend it. But the Ely approach fails as a unitary theory of equal 
protection, for it overlooks the other intellectual currents underlying 
equality under law {p. 200). Professor Douglas Laycock aptly identi-
fies the problem, for there is no historical basis for limiting the equal 
protection clause to such discrete and insular minorities,92 thereby ele-
vating one vision of equal protection over all others. Equal protection 
may have its most immediate and important application to racial mi-
norities and those who share similar characteristics, but it is not lim-
ited to such groups: 
On any given issue, anybody can be discriminated against by a majority 
running roughshod over his interests, no matter how powerful he is more 
generally. The Constitution's recognition of this argues strongly against 
Ely's view that whites are largely left out of the equal protection clause 
because they do not need the protection . 
. . . [Ely attempts] an impossible distinction between cases in which a 
group that is fairly represented in the political process loses on a particu-
lar issue or series of issues and cases in which a group is permanently 
excluded from effective political participation by the refusal of other 
groups to deal with it. 93 
the contested legislation did not operate to grant a monopoly, still, such a grant, if otherwise an 
appropriate exercise of the state's police power, is not void as denying equal protection.). 
88. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). See generally Conant, supra note 50, at 738. 
89. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 n.14 (1981). 
90. J. ELY, supra note 31. 
91. United States v. Carotene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). See generally 
Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1982). 
92. Laycock, supra note 39, at 378. 
93. Id. at 380-81 (citation omitted); see also Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: 
Flawed Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58 TEXAS L. REV. 1029 (1980). 
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Equally important, Professor Ely ignores the fact that equal pro-
tection is for individuals,94 with group membership being important 
largely because government should not penalize an individual for 
ascribed characteristics that he or she shares with others. The equal 
protection clause makes no mention of groups; it says that "any per-
son" is entitled to equal protection.95 An individual's rights should 
not turn only on whether there is an entire class of powerless vic-
tims. 96 Finally, in the Ely vision, a modem functional approach to 
politics, informed by the first amendment and the republican form of 
government clause, substitutes itself for the vision of personal liberty 
and autonomy held by many nineteenth-century advocates of equal 
protection. 97 
The historical vision of equal protection, focusing on class legisla-
tion and the equal provision of liberties, is reflected more strongly, 
however, in the "public value" approach advocated in recent years by 
Professor Cass Sunstein and Dean Robert Bennett. 98 The equal pro-
tection clause, from their perspective, forbids "unprincipled" discrimi-
nations that are premised on the view that "it is intrinsically desirable 
to treat one person better than another."99 It rejects the notion of 
"rationality" review; for rational relationship tests for assessing the fit 
between means and ends are meaningless unless the equal protection 
clause limits "the universe of permissible statutory purposes."Ioo In-
deed, most laws may not be analytically rational, but may simply re-
flect a legitimate political bargaining process - the law passed was the 
best one possible given conflicting values and goals and the need to 
achieve a majority.IOI It requires, however, that laws must be general. 
"When the government operates to benefit A and burden B, it may do 
so only if it is prepared to justify its decision by reference to a public 
value. A bare decision to prefer A to B, because the comparative dis-
advantage is intrinsically desirable, is not sufficient."I02 
The public value approach is reflected, albeit somewhat erratically, 
94. As Professor Laycock states, 
Only by assessing the political power of a group can [Ely] determine whether legislation 
affecting that group adversely is suspect. His view that women may waive their right to 
equal treatment by not pressing hard enough for it politically also highlights his focus on 
groups as the unit of analysis. 
Laycock, supra note 39, at 378 (footnote omitted). 
95. Id. at 378. 
96. Id. at 378-79. 
97. Id. at 383. 
98. See Bennett, supra note 80; Sunstein, supra note 80; see also Bice, Rationality Analysis in 
Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1980). 
99. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 128. 
100. Id. at 130. 
101. See Linde, supra note 80; Yudof, Plato's Ideal and the Perversity of Politics (Book Re-
view), 81 MICH. L. REv. 730 (1983). 
102. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 134. 
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in constitutional history. According to Professor Nelson, James Brad-
ley Thayer, the famous constitutional law scholar, told his students 
that the "first question [in equal protection analysis] is whether there 
is a rational public reason for [the classification]. A class cannot be 
selected because they have red hair, but ... [only] on the ground of 
some rational public reason" (p. 180; citation omitted). Justice Ste-
phen Field also sought to distinguish between class legislation and 
run-of-the-riiill legislative classifications. Consider this passage from 
Field's decision for the Court in Barbier v. Connolly: 103 
Special burdens are often necessary for general benefits - for supplying 
water, preventing fires, lighting districts, cleaning streets, opening parks, 
and many other objects. Regulations for these purposes may press with 
more or less weight upon one than upon another, but they are designed, 
not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon any one, but to 
promote ... the general good. Though, in many respects, necessarily 
special in their character, they do not furnish just ground of complaint if 
they operate alike upon all persons and property under the same circum-
stances and conditions. Class legislation, discriminating against some 
and favoring others, is prohibited, but legislation which, in carrying out 
a public purpose, is limited in its application ... is not within the [four-
teenth] amendment.104 
Concurring with Bennett and Sunstein, Professor Richard Kay argues 
that the vision of equal protection embodied in such decisions is that a 
"mere preference of one group over another, that is, legislation based 
only on favoritism or on spite, is outside the scope of proper govern-
mental activity."105 
Note three things about the "public value" approach to equal pro-
tection. First, race is simply one example of an unjustifiable classifica-
tion.106 A law may involve unconstitutional class legislation even 
though there is little analogy to the plight of African-Americans. As 
Senator Jacob Howard, a floor leader for the fourteenth amendment, 
said about the equal protection clause, "it abolishes all class legislation 
in the States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of 
persons to a code not applicable to another."107 Second, public values 
or legitimate governmental objectives are defined so as to exclude class 
or racial bias. This is fully consistent with Professor Nelson's history 
of the fourteenth amendment. Third, the line between class prejudice 
and reasonable regulation is so difficult to draw - often either expla-
nation may be plausible for a particular law - that there is enormous 
temptation to adopt a motivation test. What was the purpose of the 
law? Was it enacted only to favor or disfavor a particular class of 
103. 113 U.S. 27 (1885). 
104. 113 U.S. at 31-32. 
105. Kay, supra note 15, at 696. 
106. Id. 
107. Frank & Munro, supra note 40, at 441. 
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citizens, or was there some overarching public welfare purpose? Are 
the injuries imposed on the losers simply incidental to accomplishing 
another proper purpose or was the infliction of the loss the primary 
goal in the first place? 
One advantage to the "public value" standard is that it does not 
turn on only a functional view of politics, with the overlay of modern 
theories of pluralism; rather, it focuses on the nature of the classifica-
tions and admits of the application of equal protection to all persons 
- not just powerless minorities. 108 But, as Professor Sunstein admits, 
the inquiry into motivation is treacherous, requiring a rather refined 
and sophisticated inquiry into legislative purposes.109 Succinctly, leg-
islatures may not reveal their real reasons for creating a classification, 
or there may be no consensus among legislators on the purpose of a 
measure.110 Equally important, however, legislatures generally believe 
that their enactments further public values. They may believe that 
racially segregated neighborhoods and schools will promote racial har-
mony, or that laws discriminating against women workers promote 
the well-being of families. If there is something wrong with these clas-
sifications, one must either have a restricted definition of "public val-
ues" or hold the view that some classifications, even in furtherance of 
legitimate public values, are impermissible. 
IV 
In this Part, I explore the idea that the historical concept of equal 
protection, rooted in the nineteenth-century commitment to equality 
under law and animus to class legislation, is fully applicable to dis-
crimination on the basis of sex. 111 The issue should be framed with 
some care. If history in the sense of the specific intentions of the fram-
ers of the fourteenth amendment is treated as decisive, my assertion is 
most assuredly incorrect. 112 Classification by sex was widely accepted 
as legitimate in the nineteenth century, presumably being based on 
widespread sentiments (at least among men) that such laws were rea-
sonable and did not involve class legislation. 
There is little evidence in the debates over the fourteenth amend-
ment of a specific concern with sex discrimination. Professor Nelson 
devotes a number of pages to the question, but the historical record is 
sparse. (pp. 136-38, 152, 165-66) Leading feminists opposed adoption 
of the fourteenth amendment because it inserted the word "male" into 
108. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 131-35. 
109. Id. at 131. 
110. See generally Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204 (1980). 
111. The argument made here is drawn from D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, GENDER 
JUSTICE 116-20 (1986). 
112. See generally J. POLE, supra note 59, at 174-76. 
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the Constitution for the first time, implying that state governments 
could deny women the vote; 113 they unsuccessfully sought to add sex 
to the list of impermissible bases for denying suffrage under the fif-
teenth amendment. 114 Their position, however, found some sporadic 
support. For example, Republican Senator John B. Henderson "was 
one of a very few who found it difficult to understand why, under 
section two of the [fourteenth] amendment, states should be deprived 
of representation if blacks were not allowed to vote but would suffer 
no similar penalty if women were denied the franchise" (p. 137). He 
opined that the "distinction was a mere matter of temporary expedi-
ency" and that "[i]f there be no principle involved, then the amend-
ment should not be made" (pp. 137-38; citation omitted). 
Republican proponents of the fourteenth amendment, who were 
opposed to including women within the ambit of equal protection, re-
sponded in a variety of ways. Some urged that women were not the 
equals of men (p. 138). Thaddeus Stevens, invoking a common presti-
digitation with the concept of equality, simply said that "'[w]hen a 
distinction is made between two married people or two femmes sole, 
then it is unequal legislation; but where all of the same class are dealt 
with in the same way then there is no pretense of inequality' " (p. 139; 
citation omitted). Others argued that women were adequately repre-
-sented by their male fathers, husbands, and friends (p. 138). Charles 
Sumner simply opined that it was not the right political moment for 
women: 
[He] wanted to leave the question "whether women shall be invested 
with the elective franchise ... untouched, contenting myself with saying, 
that it is obviously the great question of the future, which will be easily 
settled, whenever the women in any considerable proportion insist that it 
shall be settled." For nearly all Republicans, "the enfranchisement of 
women and the enfranchisement of the blacks" bad to remain separate 
and distinct since 1866 was "'the negro's hour' .... " [p. 137] 
The issue of sex discrimination often entered into the discussions of 
the framers of the fourteenth amendment in ways analogous to the 
consideration of sex in the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, almost a hundred years later: opponents and not proponents 
of the amendment argued for the broader interpretation. Conserva-
tives urged that equality under law, as embodied in the post-Civil War 
amendments, is a unitary concept, that "if you wrong the African ... 
you wrong the woman. She has the same natural right to vote that the 
African has." 115 Senator Edgar Cowan, in the debate over the Civil 
113. Section 2 of the amendment reads in part: "But when the right to vote ••• is denied to 
any of the male inhabitants ... , the basis of representation therein shall be reduced •. , ." U.S. 
CoNsr. amend. XIV,§ 2 (emphasis added). 
114. B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & s. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE 
LAW 4 (1975). 
115. J. POLE, supra note 59, at 175 (quoting James Dixon). 
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Rights Act of 1866, was even more emphatic: 
[The Act confers] ... upon married women, upon minors, upon idiots, 
upon lunatics, and upon everybody native born in all the States, the right 
to make and enforce contracts, because there is no qualification in the 
bill, and the very object of the bill is to override the qualifications that 
are upon those rights in the States. [p. 107; footnote omitted] 
By expansively interpreting equality notions to include women and . 
others, opponents of equal protection hoped to ridicule the fourteenth 
amendment and to show its unwisdom.116 Most radical Republicans 
did not rise to the bait, but a few did proceed "from the principle of 
equality as applied to individuals regardless of property or race to 
equality regardless of sex."117 The impression is that many radicals 
well understood the implications of their principles for women, but, 
largely for fear of providing ammunition to opponents of the four-
teenth amendment, they chose not to address specifically the question 
of sex discrimination by the states.11s 
If one agrees with Leonard Levy, however, that "[t]he principles 
and not their framers' understanding and application of them are 
meant to endure,"119 then there is a strong case for treating sex classi-
fications as illegitimate under the equal protection clause. To demon-
strate this point, I tum to a much vilified source of constitutional 
principles, Herbert Spencer's Social Statics; or, The Conditions Essen-
tial to Human Happiness, first published in 1851. Spencer was a Brit-
ish contemporary of the framers of the fourteenth amendment, and he 
drew upon many of the same intellectual traditions of liberal philoso-
phy and social Darwinism that they did. 
To focus on the work of Herbert Spencer is to invite the contempt 
of generations of constitutionalists, for Spencer is identified with the 
worst excesses of substantive due process between the adoption of the 
fourteenth amendment and the ascension of the New Deal Court in 
the late 1930s. In the most infamous substantive due process case in 
constitutional history, Lochner v. New York, 120 Justice Holmes en-
sured that every law student would come to know the evil wrought by 
Mr. Spencer. In that case, Holmes vehemently dissented from the ma-
jority's decision to declare unconstitutional a New York law limiting 
the hours of employment of bakery employees. Holmes was incensed 
by what he believed was the substitution of the majority's own polit-
ical and economic philosophy for that of the legislature in the guise of 
116. Id. at 174-75. 
117. Id. at 175. 
118. Id. at 175-76. 
119. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY 
AMERICAN HISTORY 309 (1960). 
120. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See generally w. SWINDLER, CoURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE OLD LEGALITY, 1889-1932 (1969); Benedict, supra note 45. 
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constitutional law. And, in perhaps the most famous put-down in 
American judicial history, he chastised his fellow justices for reading 
Herbert Spencer's brand of utilitarian philosophy into the 
Constitution: 
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of 
the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed 
with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before mak-
ing up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I 
strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do 
with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law. It is settled 
by various decisions of this court that ... state laws may regulate life in 
many ways which we as legislators might think as injudicious or if you 
like as tyrannical as this . . . . The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes 
so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same, 
which has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is interfered 
with by school laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal insti-
tution which takes his money for purposes thought desirable, whether he 
likes it or not. The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spen-
cer's Social Statics. 121 
Justice Holmes quite obviously was familiar with Herbert Spen-
cer's Social Statics, 122 and, despite the disclaimer that he had not made 
up his mind on Spencer's theory, he clearly was not thrilled by the 
insights of an unreconstructed nineteenth-century liberal - at least 
where they were to be imposed by courts. 123 Spencer opposed govern-
ment administration of schools as an unnecessary and totalitarian im-
pulse, 124 he thought that government delivery of the mail was based on 
the infringement of the liberty of those who were forbidden from com-
peting, 12s and he viewed virtually all taxes as an assault on liberty, 126 
including taxes to support public health and sanitation measures. 127 
He also felt that state interference with the liberty to exchange one's 
property or labor was one of "the worst violations of human 
rights." 128 
But in areas not dealing with regulation of commerce, taxation, 
and public services, Spencer expressed views that Justice Holmes 
might have found more compatible with his constitutional principles. 
Spencer, ever the rigorous devotee of liberal philosophy, methodically 
121. 198 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added). 
122. H. SPENCER, supra note 1. The views of Justice Holmes on Spencer and Social Darwin-
ism are complex, and the reader should consult the excellent work of Professor Hovenkamp. See 
Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEXAS L. REV. 645, 660-64 (1985). 
123. Hovenkamp, supra note 122, at 660-61. 
124. H. SPENCER, supra note I, at 360-65. 
125. Id. at 440. 
126. Id. at 307. 
127. Id. at 407. 
128. Id. at 329. 
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and rigidly applied that philosophy to all manner of legal and policy 
questions, allowing it to lead him where it may. For example, he ar-
gued that "nothing is to be feared from the most uncontrolled utter-
ances of thought and feeling," 129 a position on freedom of expression 
more akin to, though perhaps more absolutist than, that of Justice 
Holmes. In the present context, however, I wish to explore Spencer's 
conception of equality under law, a conception that bears marked sim-
ilarities to the Framers' own contemporaneous vision. 
Spencer's basic thesis in Social Statics is that "man's happiness can 
only be produced by· the exercise of his faculties" and that to exercise 
those faculties "he must have liberty to do all that his faculties natu-
rally impel him to do."130 Man thus "has a right to that liberty," and 
such a right fulfills the Divine will. 131 The problem is that liberties 
may conflict, and thus there arises the need for limits on liberty. 132 He 
then embraces the Millian proposition 133 "that every man may claim 
the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties compatible with the posses-
sion of like liberty by every other man."134 But in the practical world 
of human affairs "detailed knowledge" of the "human constitution" 
and the consequences of human action are "unattainable," and hence 
the only practical solution is that "the law of equal freedom" should 
be recognized as the only "limit to the exercise of the faculties." 135 
The argument becomes murkier at this point, but it apparently is 
along the lines that equal constraints on liberty, inflicting benefit or 
harm on everyone, will lead to the abandonment of limitations on lib-
erty that are not required to avoid inflicting injury on others.136 Thus, 
he concludes: 
Freedom being the prerequisite to normal life in the individual, equal 
freedom becomes the prerequisite to normal life in society. And if this 
law of equal freedom is the primary law of right relationship between 
man and man, then no desire to get fulfilled a secondary law can warrant 
us in breaking it. 137 
Spencer's basic proposition of "equal freedom" bears a great simi-
larity to the antebellum notions of equality under law and the need for 
general laws that do not favor a particular class. And, like his contem-
poraries in America, he also is better at articulating the general theory 
than in working through all of its applications. He is remarkably si-
129. Id. at 171. 
130. Id. at 93. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. See J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
134. H. SPENCER, supra note 1, at 93-94. 
135. Id. at 102. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 106. William Graham Sumner, an American Social Darwinist, took a similar 
view of the meaning of equality. See Hovenkamp, supra note 122, at 669. 
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lent on the question of how one distinguishes between a violation of 
equal freedom and the advancement of legitimate state objectives 
through laws that classify people. Perhaps this is less of a problem for 
him because he sees such a limited role for government. But what is 
intriguing about Spencer's concept of equal freedom is that he saw it 
as fully applicable to women and protective of their liberties: 
Equity knows no difference of sex. In its vocabulary the word man must 
be understood in a generic, and not in a specific sense. The law of equal 
freedom manifestly applies to the whole race - female as well as male. 
The same a priori reasoning which establishes that law for men ... may 
be used with equal cogency on behalf of women. The Moral Sense, by 
virtue of which the masculine mind responds to that law, exists in the 
feminine mind as well. Hence the several rights deducible from that law 
must appertain equally to both sexes. 138 
Spencer devotes an entire chapter of Social Statics to "The Rights 
ofWomen"139 and he is at great pains to establish that the principle of 
equal freedom does not permit discrimination based on sex. He denies 
that "the differences of bodily organization, and those trifling mental 
variations which distinguish female from male, should exclude one-
half of the race from the benefits" of equal freedom. 140 The burden of 
proof lies with those who would deny that women are the equals of 
men and assert that they are "creatures of an inferior order,"141 and he 
concludes that no such showing can be made. 142 He also suggests that 
even if he is wrong on his facts, the argument for nondiscrimination 
against women is compelling: 
Not only, however, does the theory ... fall to pieces under the mere 
process of inspection; it is absurd on the very face of it . . . . For what is 
it that we mean by rights? Nothing else than freedom to exercise the 
faculties. And what is the meaning of the assertion that woman is men-
tally inferior to man? Simply that her faculties are less powerful. What 
then does the dogma, that because woman is mentally inferior to man 
she has less extensive rights, amount to? Just this - that because wo-
man has weaker faculties than man, she ought to have like liberty with 
him, to exercise the faculties she has! 143 
Spencer's conclusion, which might easily have been reached by a 
modern court, is that judgments about the relative capacities of wo-
men are likely to be based on stereotypes and not facts and that, in any 
event, the principle of equal freedom would allow women to exercise 
whatever faculties they possess. There simply is no need to reinforce 
the stereotypes through law, whatever one's view of their correctness. 
138. H. SPENCER, supra note 1, at 173. 
139. Id. at 173-91. 
140. Id. at 173. 
141. Id. at 173-74. 
142. Id. at 175. 
143. Id. at 177. 
May 1990] Equal Protection 1393 
His conclusion is that the unequal treatment of women and blacks is 
more a function of the selfishness of the dominant groups than it is a 
function of the logical application of the principle of equal freedom. 144 
Indeed, he confides that once the arguments for the unequal treatment 
of women are no longer left to tacit understanding145 but are brought 
into the open, "Few will have [the] hardihood to assert" their 
inferiority.146 
Spencer's conclusion that women were entitled to equality under 
the law does not necessarily mean that his vision was embraced in the 
concept of equal protection in the fourteenth amendment. Justice 
Holmes' admonition is still well recalled. But there were signs, how-
ever inchoate, that American law was moving in that direction even 
prior to the adoption of the amendrilent. In the first half of the nine-
teenth century, women had benefited enormously from the movement 
away from status and toward individual liberty, even if that movement 
was more a reflection of economic changes than of changing percep-
tions of the place of women.147 In 1839, Mississippi recognized the 
legal capacity of women, and by 1850 about half of the states had 
enacted laws recognizing the property rights of married women.148 
These new laws were not extensively debated in legislative bodies, and 
they did not receive significant attention in the press.149 Litigation 
arising out of the Married Women's Property Acts was largely initi-
ated by creditors, with very few cases litigated between husbands and 
wives. Lawrence Friedman describes these laws as the ratification of a 
"silent revolution."150 
Friedman's description gives us a clue to the profound difficulties 
of discussing sex classifications and the scheme of the fourteenth 
amendment. Sex classifications disadvantaging women were largely 
viewed as paternalistic and benign.151 Where such paternalism ap-
peared ill-suited and inconsistent with economic necessity, significant 
changes were made in state laws. Thus, sex discrimination simply was 
not viewed as a problem by many, and state bans on special legislation 
and provisions on equality under law generally were not invoked to 
strike down such discrimination. This inability to recognize sex classi-
fications as inconsistent with equality under law carried over into the 
debates over the fourteenth amendment. 
144. Id at 178-79. 
145. Id at 173. 
146. Id. at 174. 
147. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 78, at 186. 
148. H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, supra note 11, at 51. See generally Chusecl, Married Wo-
men's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359 (1983). 
149. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 78, at 186. 
150. Id 
151. See D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 111, at 119. 
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But status came to take on a larger meaning after the Civil War, 
referring to the assignment of legal rights and obligations on the basis 
of ascribed and not achieved characteristics.152 It is interesting to note 
in this regard that the Civil War amendments to the Constitution 
make reference to two types of status distinctions. The thirteenth 
amendment, abolishing slavery, naturally refers to slavery and invol-
untary servitude. 153 The fourteenth amendment makes no reference to 
slavery at all. But the fifteenth amendment states that the rights of 
citizen of the United States to vote shall not be abridged "on account 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."154 Arbitrariness 
Ues in classifying persons in accordance with their birthrights (slave 
status) or other characteristics (race) over which they have little or no 
control; a reasonable classification takes into account their wills, the 
things they are able to choose to do or not do within the limits of their 
capacities and the social order.155 
Until the twentieth century, litigants attacking the constitutional-
ity of unequal treatment of women under the law relied almost exclu-
sively on the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth 
amendment, not equal protection. 156 In the Slaughter-House Cases, 157 
the Supreme Court effectively read the privileges and immunities 
clause out of the fourteenth amendment; one day later, in Bradwell v. 
State, 158 the Court held that denying Myra Bradwell a license to prac-
tice law on the basis of her sex did not violate the privileges and immu-
nities clause. 159 The following Term, in Minor v. Happersett, 16o the 
Court unanimously rejected a woman's insistence that a state statute 
rendering her ineligible to vote in national elections violated the privi-
leges and immunities clause. 
Perhaps it is worth pausing to consider the Slaughter-House and 
Minor cases. Distinguished historians such as Charles Fairman have 
found it intriguing that the first Supreme Court case to construe di-
rectly the privileges and immunities, due process, and equal protection 
clauses of the fourteenth amendment involved Southern whites, who 
wished to challenge "carpetbagger" legislation, and not black victims 
152. See F. HAYEK, supra note 32, at 154. See generally P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL 
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979). 
153. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I. 
154. U.S. CONST. amend. xv, § I. 
155. See F. HAYEK, supra note 32, at 170. 
156. See R. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1981). 
157. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
158. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). 
159. Compare Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1872) with In re Leach, 134 Ind. 665, 34 N.E. 
641 (1893) (Neither the Indiana Constitution nor its laws deny women the right to practice law 
in the state, and upon application, and proper evidence, they are entitled to admission to the 
bar.). 
160. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). 
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of discrimination.161 More than a thousand butchers were put out of 
work by the legislation, and their contention was that the establish-
ment of the slaughter-house monopoly, largely through bribery in the 
Louisiana legislature, deprived them of the liberty to pursue a lawful 
employment.162 The plaintiffs' briefs drew on old English law con-
cerning monopolies, and on an array of learning and natural law to 
establish that liberty to pursue one's chosen employment was a pro-
tected constitutional privilege.163 The standard explanation for this 
extraordinary appeal by white southerners to a constitutional amend-
ment addressed to protecting blacks is that the plaintiffs had no choice 
since Louisiana courts were dominated by unsympathetic carpetbag-
gers.164 In addition, the butchers hired former Supreme Court Justice 
John A. Campbell to represent them, and it was thought that he might 
"captivate the minds of the Justices."16s 
The Court's resolution of the case has been attacked from many 
quarters.166 A five-Justice majority held that plaintiffs had not been 
denied any protected privileges and immunities, and, in a few tortu-
ously reasoned passages, forever sapped that clause of any significant 
meaning. 167 Justice Miller also expressed his "doubt ... whether any 
action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the 
negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to 
come within the purview of [the fourteenth amendment]."168 
But whatever the Court's treatment of the natural law and equal-
ity-under-law components of the amendment, many applauded the 
majority's unwillingness to embrace a laissez-faire philosophy in the 
garb of constitutional doctrine.169 For a brief time at least, the Jus-
tices were not swayed by Mr. Herbert Spencer's utilitarian philosophy. 
Conversely, the dissenters took a broader view of privileges and immu-
nities, but appeared to lay the groundwork for now-repudiated notions 
of substantive due process and the need to protect economic liberties 
161. 6 c. FAIRMAN, HISfORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: REcoN-
SfRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88: PART ONE 1308 (1971) (The Slaughter-House Case "was 
all out of accord with what members of Congress had had in mind in their debates."). 
162. Id. at 1321-32; see also 2 c. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HIS-
TORY S33-61 (1932); Conant, supra note SO, at 823-28. 
163. See 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: CONSflTUTIONAL LAW S3S-683 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 197S). See generally 
Conant, supra note SO. 
164. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 161, at 1319. But see Conant, supra note SO. 
16S. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 161, at 1319. 
166. See, e.g., L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? 194-98 (197S); Conant, supra note SO, at 825-26; 
Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REv. 3 (19S4). 
167. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); see also L. LUSKY, supra note 166, 
at 194-98. 
168. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 81; see p. 162. 
169. See, e.g., C. FAIRMAN, supra note 161, at 1370-74; H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 113. 
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from government regulation. 170 These interpretations of the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases have much to commend them, as does the view that a 
conservative majority on the Court was seeking to restrain the very 
federal power that radical Republican Congresses had sought to ex-
pand.171 The result in this case may well have turned more on concep-
tions of federalism and of appropriate limits on federal courts than a 
careful parsing of the terms of the fourteenth amendment (pp. 162-63). 
While, to be sure, the various opinions and briefs in the Slaughter-
House Cases are confused and conflicting, reflecting the complexity of 
the issues and the paucity of federal precedents, 172 there is an alterna-
tive hypothesis that would explain the filing of such a suit (pp. 158-
60). The Louisiana statute named seventeen specific incorporators of 
the Crescent City Company who were to benefit from the monopoly-
creating law173 and the public health rationale for the statute may 
have been a blatant subterfuge for special legislation to benefit a 
known and identified small group of citizens.174 From this perspec-
tive, the claims of the plaintiffs flowed naturally from the conception 
of equal protection that preceded the adoption of the fourteenth 
amendment (p. 156). The class was closed, and the beneficiaries were 
specifically named and not identified by their superior capacity to 
carry out particular functions. The law was not general and abstract; 
it favored a particular set of individuals. One may concede that Loui-
siana may regulate slaughter-houses for the general welfare, compel-
ling them to locate outside of New Orleans, without conceding that it 
has the power to pass such special legislation.175 Indeed, one reading 
of Justice Miller's majority opinion is that he agreed with this state-
ment of principle but disagreed on its application to the facts of the 
case (pp. 158-60). 
Unfortunately, Justice Miller also sought to support his decision 
against the butchers with arguments that the fourteenth amendment 
only protected African-Americans. He did so, however, in complete 
disregard of history. Professor Nelson is exactly right in pointing out 
the error of Miller's ways: 
Justice Miller's approaches for narrowing the reach of section one were 
170. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 161, at 1385. See Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: 
Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 767; Conant, supra note 50, at 828 
n.198. See generally Kay, supra note 15. 
171. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 161, at 1321. See also Murphy, Slaughter-House, Civil Rights, 
and Limits on Constitutional Change 32 AM. J. JURIS. 1 (1987). 
172. For example, the plaintiffs' attorney in his brief discussed the 1848 Republican Consti-
tution of France, Macaulay, Fortescue, and numerous English cases on monopolies. See Kur-
land & Casper, supra note 163, at 550-62. ' 
173. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 161, at 1322. 
174. Id. at 1322-23; see also Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Assn. v. Crescent City Live-
Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 653 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (Bradley, J.). 
175. Professor Conant reaches the same conclusion through a historical reconstruction of the 
privileges and immunities clause. See Conant, supra note 50. 
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flatly inconsistent with the history of its framing in Congress and its 
ratification by the state legislatures. . . . While equality for blacks was 
surely the central concern of the amendment's framers and ratifiers, it 
was never their sole and exclusive concern. Those who discussed the 
amendment were aware of its implications for other groups, such as Chi-
nese, Indians, women, and religious minorities. Moreover, there is no 
doubt that the proponents of the amendment meant to protect yet an-
other group - namely, Northern whites who were migrating to the 
South after the Civil War and were threatened with potentially discrimi-
natory legislation at the hands of Southern states and localities. It was 
simply wrong for Justice Miller to suggest that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment could be limited only to cases of discrimination against blacks. [p. 
163] 
Thus, by unnecessarily going beyond the narrowest ground on which 
his decision might have rested, perhaps to reply to the assertions of the 
dissenters (p. 162), Justice Miller did incalculable damage to four-
teenth amendment jurisprudence. In one opinion he managed to de-
molish the natural law and equality-under-law underpinnings that 
were so much in evidence only a few years earlier. 
Justice Field, perceiving an equal protection component in the 
privileges and immunities clause,176 adhered to an equality-under-law 
approach when he opined that government might provide for exclusive 
franchises in extraordinary circumstances or regulate generally for the 
public convenience, but this is very different "from a grant, with exclu-
sive privileges, of a right to pursue one of the ordinary trades or call-
ings of life, which is a right appertaining solely to the individual."177 
It is one thing to proscribe regulations for all, even if it impedes em-
ployment choices, and quite another to name those citizens who may 
pursue a calling and those who may not: "The fourteenth amend-
ment, in my judgment, makes it essential to the validity of the legisla-
tion of every State that this equality of right should be respected."178 
Lest one accuse Field of too radical a bent, he defined equality of lib-
erty in the following terms: "To [citizens of the United States] every-
where, all pursuits, all professions, all avocations are open without 
other restrictions than such as are imposed equally upon all others of 
the same age, sex, and condition."179 Thus, with the addition of race 
to the list of impermissible classifications, Field saw equality-under-
law in very much the same terms as Jacksonians forty years earlier. 
The contention that the Slaughter-House Cases raised issues within 
the core of the concerns of the framers of the fourteenth amendment is 
reinforced by reactions to the decision in Louisiana. 18° For example, 
176. Id. at 826-27. 
177. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 88 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting). 
178. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 110. 
179. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 110. 
180. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 161, at 1371-74, 1379-80. 
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when Francies R. T. Nichols, the candidate for Governor of the Demo-
cratic Party in 1876, finally ousted the Republican regime, he declared 
"that he would 'carry out faithfully and impartially the amendments 
to the Constitution' and that he was 'utterly opposed to class legisla-
tion.' " 181 In 1881, the city council of New Orleans abolished the mo-
nopoly pursuant to an 1879 state constitutional amendment. 182 The 
company challenged the abolition as a violation of the contract clause, 
and in 1884 the Supreme Court unanimously sustained the law. 183 
In a concurring opinion in the second litigation, Justice Field cov-
ered much of the same ground as in his dissenting opinion in the first 
case, arguing that only age, sex, and condition might be taken into 
account in distinguishing among ascribed characteristics of persons. 184 
But he also sharpened his views. The fourteenth amendment did not 
"limit the subjects upon which the States can legislate": 
They can now, as then, legislate to promote health, good order and 
peace, to develop their resources, enlarge their industries, and advance 
their prosperity. It only inhibits discriminating and partial enactments, 
favoring some to the impairment of the rights of others. The principal, if 
not the sole, purpose of its prohibitions is to prevent arbitrary invasion 
by State authority of the rights of person and property, and to secure to 
every one the right to pursue his happiness unrestrained, except by just, 
equal, and impartial laws.185 
Justice Bradley's concurring opinion was equally emphatic. The 
states might constitutionally apply "general regulations, applying 
equally to all, as the general good may demand .... "186 But Louisi-
ana's monopoly law violated "the last clause of the section - 'no State 
shall deny to any person the equal protection of the laws.' " 
If it is not a denial of the equal protection of the laws to grant to one 
man, or set of men, the privilege of following an ordinary calling in a 
large community, and to deny it to all others, it is difficult to understand 
what would come within the constitutional prohibition.187 
In Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 188 Justice Bradley had said much the same 
thing. The tragedy of later Court decisions is that they ignored the 
equal protection principles inherent in the earlier Field and Bradley 
positions and the concessions to state regulatory power, and chose to 
181. Id. at 1379. 
182. Id. at 1380. 
183. Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884). 
184. 111 U.S. at 757 (Field, J., concurring). 
185. 111 U.S. at 759; see also American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89 (1900); 
Bell's Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1890); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885). 
See generally Kay, supra note 15. 
186. 111 U.S. at 763 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
187. 111 U.S. at 765-66 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
188. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129 (1873). 
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amplify the looser language relating to the right to pursue a calling or 
business. As Professor Gordon has noted: 
Men like Cooley, Dillon, Field and Miller, who helped put the structure 
together, were old Jacksonians and intensely suspicious of corporate 
privilege. Their desire to limit legislative power stemmed as much from 
terror of a corrupt legislative-corporate alliance as from the specter of 
radicalism; they wanted to eliminate all legal patronage of particularism. 
Besides, [the theory] did not condemn the exercise of state power as long 
as it remained within its proper sphere, and the extensive regulation of 
public service corporations, occupations, and morals in the late nine-
teenth century ... showed how broad the sphere could be.189 
The Minor decision190 casts some light on the discomfiture of the 
nation's highest court with state-sanctioned sex discrimination, despite 
its tolerance of such inequalities under the law. The Minor Court 
went to considerable lengths to confirm the fact that women were citi-
zens of the United States and persons under the Constitution. It noted 
that women were members of the polity, that the Constitution was 
established by "the people," including women, and that (in contrast to 
its discredited decision in the Dred Scott case on blacks) women had 
long been treated as citizens for purposes of federal diversity jurisdic-
tion over controversies between citizens of different states.191 The 
Chief Justice even opined that "[t]here cannot be a nation without a 
people," and that women had always been citizens, the fourteenth 
amendment not having affected "the citizenship of women any more 
than it did of men."192 · 
How then did Mrs. Minor lose her lawsuit? The Court extensively 
reviewed the franchise under state constitutions at the time of the 
adoption of the federal constitution, and found that the states disen-
franchised many citizens, including women. Further, the privileges 
and immunities clause of article IV of the Constitution, giving the citi-
zens of each state rights in their several states, 193 had never been con-
strued so as to give a citizen a right to vote in more than one state. In 
short, in the absence of express language to the contrary, the Court 
concluded that the right to vote was not among the privileges and im-
munities protected by the fourteenth amendment.194 
This conclusion was bolstered by a logical point: "If suffrage was 
one of these privileges or immunities, why amend the Constitution to 
prevent its being denied on account of race, etc.?"195 This reference to 
189. Gordon, supra note 56, at 92-93 (footnotes omitted). 
190. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). 
191. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 165-67. 
192. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 165, 170. 
193. U.S. CONST. art. IV. 
194. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 171. 
195. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 175. 
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the fifteenth amendment probably confirmed the worst fears of those 
feminists who had opposed the fourteenth amendment and attempted 
to revise the fifteenth amendment. Women were only vaguely pro-
tected by the Constitution, and that protection could easily be 
negated. 196 
Neither counsel nor the Court in Minor questioned whether a clas-
sification by sex, of individuals acknowledged to be citizens and per-
sons under the Constitution, violated the equal protection of the laws. 
The Court was more interested in the nature of the interest that had 
been affected than in the nature of the classification creating the ine-
quality under the law. 
After Minor and the Slaughter-House Cases, federal and state 
courts, drawing, however ineptly, on the natural law vision of the 
fourteenth amendment, came to pay new attention to the types of sub-
stantive interests protected by that amendment in the last years of the 
nineteenth century, relying on the due process clause and not the priv-
ileges and immunities clause. As Justice Holmes concluded, judges 
began with "an unpretentious assertion of the liberty to follow the or-
dinary callings" and then expanded that "innocuous generality . . . 
into the dogma [of] Liberty of Contract."197 That is, it is one thing to 
forbid the states from limiting a profession to named individuals and 
quite another to forbid them from regulating a profession to achieve a 
public purpose.198 In this era of substantive due process, the courts 
struck down many laws on the theory that they unconstitutionally in-
terfered with a person's freedom to enter into contracts. 
The development of substantive due process doctrine raised a novel 
issue relating to classifications by sex. If persons were entitled to the 
protections of due process oflaw, including the liberty to contract, and 
if women were persons, on what basis might women be subject to 
greater restrictions on their freedom to contract than men?199 Though 
the analysis could easily have been framed in equal protection terms, 
courts declined to proceed in this manner, for they were chiefly con-
cerned with the elaboration of freedom of contract. Statutes discrimi-
nating on the basis of sex were rarely attacked prior to 1900, and such 
attacks usually failed.200 In Holden v. Hardy, 201 upholding a Utah law 
196. See generally Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 B. U. L. RBV. 
723 (1935). 
197. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 568 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See gen· 
erally Forbath, supra note 170. 
198. See also Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885). See generally Forbath, supra note 170; 
Kay, supra note 15, at 681-86, 701-05. 
199. D. KlRP, M. YuooF & M. FRANKS, supra note 111, at 118. A similar analysis of the 
race cases in the progressive era has been undertaken by President Benno Schmidt of Yale. See 
Schmidt, Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era, Part /: 
The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1982). 
200. But see Ritchie v. Illinois, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454 (1895); People v. Williams, 189 N.Y. 
131, 81 N.E. 778 (1907). Ritchie, a case decided in 1895 under the due process clause of the 
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that limited the work day of miners, the Supreme Court noted in pass-
ing that many states had enacted laws restricting the hours of employ-
ment of women and children: "[w]hile their constitutionality, at least 
as applied to women, has been doubted in some of the States," wrote 
the Court, "they have been generally upheld."202 
As previously noted, Lochner v. New York, 203 decided in 1905 by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, marked the high-water mark of the era of 
substantive due process. A bare majority of the Justices struck down a 
law prohibiting the employment of bakers for more than ten hours a 
day or sixty hours a week. The New York law interfered with the 
liberty of persons to make contracts, the Court reasoned: "There is no 
contention that bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and ca-
pacity to men in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are 
not able to assert their rights and care for themselves .. · .. "204 When 
Lochner is read in tandem with Holden, the clear implication is that 
women are incapable of protecting their own interests and appropri-
ately are treated as wards of the state,205 a proposition made explicit 
three years later in Muller v. Oregon. 206 A unanimous Court in Muller 
embraced the proposition that sex is a permissible basis for differentia-
tion, upholding a maximum-hours law applied only to women. 207 
Some thoughtful critics have applauded Muller. Constitutional 
Illinois Constitution, demonstrates that a contrary view was taken by some courts after the deci-
sion in Bradwell, some 22 years earlier. In 1893, the Illinois legislature had enacted a law prohib-
iting women, whether adults or minors, from working for more than eight hours a day in any 
factory or workshop manufacturing clothing or wearing apparel. There were at least eight chal-
lenges to the law within a two-year period (apparently all brought by male employers), and the 
Illinois Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional. The state argued that the law was 
"designed to protect woman on account of her sex and physique." 155 Ill. at 111, 40 N.E. at 458. 
The court appeared none too impressed with any law, even one of general application, that 
sought to protect people from harmful employment. 155 Ill. at 115, 40 N.E. at 459. But the 
court went further. It cited Minor for the proposition that women were citizens and persons, as 
fully protected as men by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 155 Ill. at 112, 40 
N.E. at 455. Moving to the Illinois state constitution, the court held that women were entitled to 
the same rights "to make contracts with reference to [their] labor as are ... men": 
The law accords to her, as to every other citizen, the natural right to gain a livelihood by 
intelligence, honesty and industry in the arts, the sciences, the professions or other voca-
tions. Before the law, her right to a choice of vocations cannot be said to be denied or 
abridged on account of sex. 
155 Ill. at 111-12, 40 N.E. at 458 (citation omitted). 
The Ritchie decision did not·reflect the prevalent judicial attitude toward special labor legisla-
tion for women in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ritchie itself was overruled. 
Ritchie v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509, 91 N.E. 695 (1910). See also Wenham v. Nebraska, 65 Neb. 
394, 91 N.W. 421 (1902); Commonwealth v. Hamilton Mfg. Co., 120 Mass. 383 (1876). 
201. 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
202. 169 U.S. at 395. 
203. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
204. 198 U.S. at 57. 
205. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 456 n.6 (11th ed. 1985). 
206. 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
207. See D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 111, at 118-19. 
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scholar Gerald Gunther has suggested that Lochner erred in accepting 
"inequalities of fortune," denying the legitimacy of state efforts to re-
dress such inequalities; he regards Muller a happy exception to such 
judicial insensitivity.208 I disagree. Muller undermines the concept of 
equality under law, as embodied' in the fourteenth amendment and in 
antebellum state court decisions. Depending on their skills and oppor-
tunities, bakers may choose a less dangerous profession or evade a 
state-imposed limit on working hours. A woman cannot escape her 
sex, for her options have been circumscribed on the basis of an unal-
terable personal characteristic. The law affirmed in Muller embodied 
a close-ended status distinction of precisely the sort that should be 
impermissible under the fourteenth amendment. A Court intent upon 
preserving liberty and individual autonomy and advancing the public 
welfare, while allowing legislatures to redress liberty-constricting ine-
qualities of bargaining power, should have upheld the Lochner law and 
overturned the Muller statute. 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Muller in 1915, upholding a maxi-
mum-hour law applicable only to women.209 But eight years later, in 
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 210 the Justices struck down a federal act 
fixing minimum wages for women in the District of Columbia. The 
Court declared that the statute was "a naked, arbitrary exercise of 
power that . . . cannot be allowed to stand under the Constitution of 
the United States."211 The Adkins majority had to chart a course 
through a treacherous array of precedents. By 1923, the Court had 
repudiated Lochner without expressly overruling it,212 and hence the 
Adkins Court could not rely heavily on Lochner. Instead, it chose to 
undermine Muller. 
The majority opinion in Adkins strongly endorses the equality of 
women under the law. The tenor of that opinion is that women had 
come a long way since the dark days of Muller. 213 The "ancient ine-
quality of the sexes, otherwise than physi9al," says the Court, "has 
continued with 'diminishing intensity.' "214 While physical differences 
"must be recognized in appropriate cases," the Court notes, in lan-
guage reminiscent of that of Herbert Spencer, that it could not endorse 
the notion that mature women were less capable than men of making 
208. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine 
on A Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 42 (1972). 
209. Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); see also Hawley v. Walker, 232 U.S. 718 (1914) 
(per curiam); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914). 
210. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). See D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 111, at 119-20. 
211. 261 U.S. at 559. 
212. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 205, at 459; see also Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 
(1917); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 563-64 (1923) (Taft, C.J., dissenting). 
213. See D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 111, at 119. 
214. 261 U.S. at 553. 
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contractual decisions for themselves. 215 The trend of modern legisla-
tion, "as well as that of common thought and usage," is that women 
should be emancipated from laws according them special protections 
or restraining their contractual and civil relationships. 216 Since 
Muller, "revolutionary" changes in the "contractual, political and 
civil status of women," had occurred, and thus "it is not unreasonable 
to say that these differences have now come almost, if not quite, to the 
vanishing point."217 The culmination of this revolution was the adop-
tion, in 1920, of the nineteenth amendment, extending suffrage to 
women. 
Adkins advances the proposition that women are entitled to consti-
tutional protection under the fourteenth amendment. Although the 
opinion is not couched in the language of equal protection,218 its ob-
servations are relevant to equal protection analysis. Women are no 
less capable than men of making life choices for themselves, and alleg-
edly protective legislation can be hurtful. 
The reliance by the Adkins court on the nineteenth amendment is 
well placed. That amendment specifies that the rights of "citizens" to 
vote may not be abridged on the basis of sex, thus presuming that 
women were already citizens under the Constitution. It reflects the 
changes in the status of women that had occurred since the early nine-
teenth century, extending that trend by removing the greatest remain-
ing obstacle to women's emancipation, their disenfranchisement. In so 
doing, it symbolically confirms the view that at least one historical 
understanding of equality under the law is inconsistent with statutes 
that routinely sort individuals on the basis of their sex. 
Adkins, whether a symbol of liberty for women or a misbegotten 
judicial assault on legislation protecting workers, could have provided 
the starting point for modern fourteenth amendment analysis of sex 
discrimination, connecting older conceptions of liberty, citizenship, 
and equality under law, with more modern sensitivities to unfairness 
based on sex discrimination. This did not occur, however, for the 
Supreme Court subsequently ignored Adkins; fifty years later, when 
the Court drew on the fourteenth amendment to strike down sex-based 
distinctions, Adkins went unmentioned.219 
The neglect of Adkins is entirely understandable. For one thing, 
sex discrimination was not a serious concern of the Supreme Court in 
1923, despite the Adkins opinion. At least three of the newest mem-
bers of the Court were anxious to resurrect and extend the Lochner 
substantive due process approach. Adkins inaugurated a brief period 
215. 261 U.S. at 553. 
216. 261 U.S. at 553. 
217. 261 U.S. at 553. 
218. See Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (substantive due process). 
219. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
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of heightened scrutiny of federal and state interference with freedom 
of contract;220 sex discrimination was an ancillary concern. For an-
other, Adkins marked only a "temporary" victory for equality of the 
sexes. As Blanche Crozier, an early student of women's constitutional 
rights, observed: "It does not appear that at any time since the adop-
tion of the Constitution has discrimination based on sex been uncon-
stitutional."221 Adkins itself supports this reading. 
The Adkins majority attempted to breathe new life into the Loch-
ner rule "forbidding legislative interference with freedom of con-
tract."222 The Court came to regard Adkins as a substantive due 
process case, not as a sex discrimination case. In Wolff Co. v. Indus-
trial Court, 223 for example, decided only a month after Adkins, the 
majority cites the case for the proposition that "[w]hile there is no 
such thing as absolute freedom of contract and it is subject to a variety 
of restraints, they must not be arbitrary or unreasonable. Freedom is 
the general rule, and restraint the exception. The legislative authority 
to abridge can be justified only by exceptional circumstances."224 Nor 
did the Court extend Adkins to other areas of sex discrimination; in-
stead, it resurrected Muller. In Radice v. New York, 225 decided a year 
after Adkins, the Court upheld a state law prohibiting women from 
night work in restaurants. 
Only the narrow holding of Adkins survived its subsequent elabo-
ration. And Adkins itself did not endure. Less than a year after reaf-
firming Adkins in Morehead v. New York, 226 the Court overruled both 
decisions in one of the great New Deal turnabouts, upholding a mini-
mum-wage law applicable only to women.227 Freedom of contract 
was not expressly guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment, the 
Court asserted in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, and "regulation which is 
reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of 
the community is due process."228 Adkins incorrectly departed from 
these principles, and the state might properly consider that women as 
a class receive the least pay, have less bargaining power with employ-
ers, and "are the ready victims of those who would take advantage of 
their necessitous circumstances. "229 
220. See generally E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1321-26 (1973). 
221. Crozier, supra note 196, at 745. 
222. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 550, 554 (1923). 
223. 262 U.S. 522 (1923). 
224. 262 U.S. at 534; cf. Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (fair wage law for 
women violates due process clause of fourteenth amendment). 
225. 264 U.S. 292 (1924); see D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 111, at 119-20. 
226. 298 U.S. 587 (1936). 
227. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
228. 300 U.S. at 391. 
229. 300 U.S. at 398; see also D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra note 111, at 120. 
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The idea of equality under the law for women, its wagon hitched to 
the· star of substantive due process, collapsed as that star fell. The 
Court was pressed to approve the social and economic legislation of 
the New Deal and used the West Coast Hotel case for this purpose. At 
a moment of apparent institutional crisis, the Justices were in no mood 
for refined distinctions among cases relying on a discredited doc-
trine. 230 Lochner and Adkins were lumped together, symbols of the 
judicial heresy of applying substantive due process in the economic 
domain. Adkins has never again b~en cited in a sex discrimination 
case. 
In the 1948 Goesaert case, 231 the Supreme Court upheld against 
equal protection challenge a Michigan law prohibiting a woman from 
being licensed as a bartender unless she was " 'the wife or daughter of 
the male owner' of a licensed liquor establishment."232 Goesaert 
marked the first time that the Supreme Court was faced with the con-
tention that a sex-based distinction violated the equal protection 
clause; it did not treat the moment with great seriousness. In a jocular 
three-page opinion, the majority speaks of "the alewife, sprightly and 
ribald, in Shakespeare," and notes that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment 
did not tear history up by the roots."233 
Goesaert blinks at the history of equality under the law.234 "It 
would be an idle parade of familiar learning" to review the relevant 
equal protection precedents, says the opinion.235 The Court forgets 
that the equal protection clause applies to "any person'', it does not 
speak of the antebellum history of equality under the law, and it ig-
nores the resolution of these concerns in Adkins, a case that could well 
have been given new life in equal protection garb. 236 
When sex discrimination cases again found their way to the 
Supreme Court in the 1970s, the historical underpinnings of the con-
stitutional claims had been lost. The conception of equal protection as 
centered on equality under law was obscured by a philosophical and 
ideological fixation on "suspect" classifications. The predictable out-
230. See generally Benedict, supra note 45. 
231. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). See D. KtRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, supra 
note 111, at 120. 
232. 335 U.S. at 465. 
233. 335 U.S. at 465. 
234. In fairness to the majority, it is not entirely clear whether the Court was lightly dis-
missing any claim of sex discrimination under the equal protection clause, or whether it was 
simply affirming the traditional authority of the states, embodied in the twenty-first amendment, 
to regulate the liquor trade. See, e.g., California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972). Indeed, the 
state's brief in Goesaert argued that "while discriminations against women as such are invalid, 
discriminations against them in matters relating to intoxicating liquors have consistently been 
upheld." Brief for Appellees at 23, Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
235. 335 U.S. at 467. 
236. Indeed, the Court opined that the equal protection claim of women is entirely novel, 
reflecting new "sociological insight[s]" and "shifting social standards." 335 U.S. at 466. 
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come was judicial confusion: "A nation that desiccates its history in 
the course of extracting and studying its law risks feeding itself 
pap."237 
v 
What should we make of the disunity of the equal protection 
clause, of the multiple traditions upon which it was based, and of the 
conflicts among visions of equality under law? Obviously we should 
be skeptical of any unifying or monolithic concept that purports to 
subject all cases to a single standard. There should be no assumption 
that equal protection applies only to racial and ethnic classifications 
(p. 163), that all economic classifications are permissible (p. 200), or 
that only the powerless need apply for equality under law. The more 
encompassing the theory, the more likely that it does not reflect the 
diverse origins of the equal protection clause. 
There should also be a realization that the multiple historical 
strands are reflected in the modem debates over equal protection theo-
ries, allowing each warring camp to find solace in the nineteenth-cen-
tury record. For example, devotees of fundamental rights analysis, 
urging that inequalities with respect to certain vitally important inter-
ests (e.g., voting, interstate travel, education) require a compelling 
governmental justification, may seek support in the natural law back-
ground of the equal protection clause. Where those natural or funda-
mental rights come from, whether they derive only from the text or 
structure of the Constitution, how they are limited, what the role of 
courts should be in articulating them: these are all difficult questions 
- but questions well within the natural law tradition of the clause. 
Similarly, the Jacksonian concept of equal protection, with its em-
phasis on avoiding discrimination against classes, and the race-specific 
radical Republican version of equal protection, with its emphasis on 
protecting the civil rights of African-Americans, also find strong sup-
port in history; the former, as I have attempted to demonstrate, has 
particularly significant implications for the constitutionality of sex dis-
crimination. From this perspective, the debate between those who em-
phasize immutability of class characteristics and those who emphasize 
powerlessness and isolation from the normal political processes is en-
tirely understandable, for both images of equality are reflected in the 
mirror of equal protection. They attempt to extrapolate from two his-
torical concepts: the paradigm case of racial discrimination and the 
antebellum hostility to special laws and class legislation. 
The multiple dimensions of the equal protection clause also give us 
some insight into the disarray and chaos in equal protection doctrine 
237. H. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 248; see also White, Law as Language: Reading Law and 
Reading Literature; 60 TEXAS L. REV. 415 (1982). 
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between the Slaughter-House Cases in 1873 and the end of the substan-
tive due process era during the New Deal, a disarray that to some 
extent is still with us. One should begin with the understanding that 
the framers of the fourteenth amendment were not perfect artisans of 
legal principles, that they did not consider the many permutations of 
their concepts of liberty and equality, and that their principles, as is 
true for all mortals, were often in conflict. They were, first and fore-
most, politicians savoring the fruits of victory (pp. 110-11, 143). 
But a theory of equal protection should not be rejected simply be-
cause there are hard cases or ambiguities (p. 177). The closed nature 
of a classification or its reliance on immutable characteristics, for ex-
ample, may well undergird some concepts of equal protection, though 
few would claim that a profoundly retarded person has a constitu-
tional right to a government job as a nuclear physicist. In general, 
laws focusing on named individuals may be impermissible, but occa-
sionally there may be a legitimate class of one. Abstract principles, 
particularly when they conflict, cannot eliminate the need for 
judgment. 
Once we abandon the idea that the framers were perfect, if only the 
interpreters were more attentive to their revealed purposes, it follows 
that some doctrinal disarray is inevitable. For example, Justice :field 
tried to the best of his ability, which was considerable, to distinguish 
between privilege and class favoritism, and necessary and reasonable 
regulation of economic affairs (pp. 172-74). But even he had trouble, 
on many occasions, discerning the difference - particularly with in-
creasing industrialization and state efforts to protect workers. As Pro-
fessor Kay notes, this Jacksonian distinction tended to collapse and a 
boundless search for reasonableness - what pleased the Justices.-
was substituted in its place. 238 This approach came to be identified 
with the now-repudiated era of substantive due process. 
Once the era of substantive due process came to an end and equal 
protection became the primary framework for analysis, the judicial fo-
cus came to be upon motivation as a means of distinguishing between 
unconstitutional laws that create privilege or discriminate against 
identifiable classes and laws that were permissible, though they might 
have side-effects that benefited or harmed particular individuals and 
classes. Doctrines of constitutional motivation may be viewed as a 
way of reconciling Jacksonian democratic principles with the necessi-
ties of the modern, bureaucratized welfare state. If such approaches 
appear inadequate, the problem may lie as much with the inadequacy 
of the multiple visions embodied in the equal protection clause as with 
our own lack of perception as interpreters of the past. 
For all the advantages of recognizing the disunity of the concept of 
238. Kay, supra note 15, at 722. 
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equal protection, there also are sirens that may lead us dangerously 
astray. Some constitutionalists may succumb to temptation, believing 
that a cornucopia of visions justifies nearly any judicial result, that 
there is no such thing as a right or wrong result under the equal pro-
tection clause. But scholars and courts should think long and hard 
before fashioning an equal protection clause out of such malleable ma-
terial, retreating to the utter subjectivity of one equal protection clause 
for each interpreter. There is much ground, high ground, between an 
oversimplified unitary theory of equal protection and the infinite un-
predictability and chaos of complete subjectivity. Constitutionalists 
should urgently seek that high ground, and we are indebted to Profes-
sor Nelson for providing the historical analysis to nurture their efforts. 
